



Caribbean Studies
Universidad de Puerto Rico
viiglesias@rrpac.upr.clu.edu
ISSN (Versión impresa): 0008-6533
PUERTO RICO

2005
Philippe Zacaïr
HAITI ON HIS MIND: ANTONIO MACEO AND CARIBBEANNESS
Caribbean Studies, january-june, año/vol. 33, número 001
Universidad de Puerto Rico
San Juan, Puerto Rico
pp. 47-78

Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina y el Caribe, España y Portugal

Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México



HAITI ON HIS MIND: ANTONIO MACEO AND CARIBBEANNESS

Philippe Zacaïr

ABSTRACT

The Afro-Cuban Antonio Maceo was one of the leading figures of Cuba's independence movement, but historians have misunderstood his relationship with Haiti and vision of a united Caribbean people. Maceo's struggle against Spanish colonialism was closely associated to the ideal of Caribbeanness. His vision of Caribbeanness proceeded from the definition of his relationship with the neighboring Republic of Haiti. Maceo claimed Haitian history and heritage of liberty and resistance as his own, beside overwhelming depiction of the "Black Republic" by the defenders of colonialism as the antithesis of civilization. He called for the birth Caribbean political entity including Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, while opposing the concept of a Black republic as undemocratic. He established complex relationships, and more extensive than previously thought, with many protagonists of Haitian politics. He envisioned the union of Cuba and Haiti as the source and guarantee of freedom, social justice and independence.

Keywords: Maceo, Cuba, Haiti, race, Caribbean confederation, nationalism

RESUMEN

El afro-cubano Antonio Maceo fue una de las principales figuras en el movimiento por la independencia de Cuba, pero los historiadores han incomprendido su relación con Haití y su visión de un Caribe unificado. La lucha de Maceo en contra del colonialismo español estaba estrechamente ligada al ideal caribeñista. Su visión del caribeñismo la originó la definición de su relación con la vecina República de Haití. Maceo proclamó como suyas la historia y el legado de libertad y resistencia haitianas, en contra de la abrumadora descripción de la "República Negra" que hacían los defensores del colonialismo como la antítesis de

la civilización. Hizo un llamado a la formación del Caribe como ente político incluyendo a Cuba, Haití y República Dominicana, mientras se oponía al concepto de República Negra como uno no democrático. Estableció relaciones complejas, aún más de lo que se pensaba, con muchos protagonistas de la política haitiana. Imaginó la unión de Cuba y Haití como fuente y garantía de libertad, justicia social e independencia.

Palabras clave: Maceo, Cuba, Haití, raza, Confederación Caribeña, nacionalismo

RÉSUMÉ

L'Afro Cubain, Antonio Maceo était l'une des figures importantes du mouvement indépendantiste cubain, mais les historiens ont mal compris sa relation avec Haïti et sa vision d'un peuple caribéen uni. La lutte de Maceo contre le colonialisme espagnol était étroitement liée à l'idéal de l'Antillanité. La définition de sa relation avec le pays voisin, la République d'Haïti, a été à la origine de sa vision de l'identité caribéenne. Maceo proclamait comme siens l'histoire et l'héritage de liberté et de résistance d'Haïti, contrairement à l'accablante représentation de la «République Noire», en tant qu'antithèse de la civilisation, faite par les défenseurs du colonialisme. Alors qu'il s'opposait au concept de la République Noire jugé antidémocratique, il a réclamé la création d'une entité politique caribbéenne incluant Cuba, Haïti et la République Dominicaine. Il a noué des relations complexes, et bien plus étendues que prévu, avec de nombreux protagonistes de la politique haïtienne. Il a envisagé l'union de Cuba et d'Haïti comme la source et la garantie de la liberté, de la justice sociale et de l'indépendance.

Mots-clés: Maceo, Cuba, Haïti, race, confédération caribéenne, nationalisme

Received: 5 May 2004. Revision received: 18 October 2004.

Accepted: 21 October 2004

Antonio Maceo Grajales was one of the leading figures of Cuba's independence movement, but historians have misunderstood his relationship with Haiti and vision of a united Caribbean people.

At the start of the year 1878, the eastern provinces of the Spanish Caribbean colony of Cuba were the stage of the last military events of the Ten Years' War (Collazo 1893; Figueredo Socarrás 1968; Ochando 1878; Piralá 1895-1898). At this point, many participants of the Cuban anti-colonial insurrection chose to welcome the Spanish peace proposals, and to abandon the armed struggle.¹ A notable exception, however, emerged in the person of Maceo, a Cuban of African descent who had achieved considerable fame during the war as an outstanding soldier and was holding the top rank of "major general" in the Cuban liberation army.² On March 15, 1878, in Baraguá, in a meeting held with Spanish general-in-chief Arsenio Martínez Campos, Maceo emphatically rejected the peace treaty that fulfilled neither of the insurgents' most fundamental aspirations—the independence of Cuba and the abolition of slavery.³

Maceo's act of resistance, known as the Protest of Baraguá, was widely noticed and held as a political landmark by both protagonists and foreign observers of the Cuban events, regardless of their favorable or hostile feelings *vis-à-vis* the Afro-Cuban fighter (Figueredo Socarrás 1968:572; Ochando 1878:143; Camps y Feliú 1890:404; Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989:146-148; Foner 1977:82-83). Maceo became "the subject that occupied all minds [...], the theme of all the press articles" according to Fernando Figueredo Socarrás (1968:573), a prominent Cuban insurgent and an eyewitness of the Protest of Baraguá. Figueredo, however, neither reported nor reflected on a significant political declaration made by Maceo ten days after the meeting, shortly after the war resumed. In a printed proclamation of March 25, 1878, in which he justified his opposition to the peace treaty and called on the continuation of resistance, Maceo expressed his wish for a "new republic assimilated to that of our sisters Santo Domingo and Haiti" (Maceo 1950:102).

Maceo's call for a union between Cuba and her Caribbean

neighbors of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to obtain the abolition of slavery and the independence of his island was unique. In his latest study of the Afro-Cuban's political ideology, Eduardo Torres Cuevas (1995:153) contends that it was the "Caribbean similarities" of Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, that led Maceo to envision such a union. Similarly, Aline Helg (2001:82) sees in Maceo's protest "an affirmation of Cuba's Afro-Caribbeanness." Yet, Maceo's thought on Caribbeanness requires far more critical analysis than afforded to date.

The notion of Caribbeanness that was latent in the Greater Caribbean in the second half of the nineteenth century refers to a conviction found among significant intellectuals, statesmen and military figures of the different islands of the region. Cuban poet and thinker José Martí, Puerto Rican intellectuals Ramón Emeterio Betances and Eugenio María de Hostos, among others, shared the ideological belief that they belonged to a single people sharing a common history, a common identity, and aspiring to a common future (Estrade 1982; Rama 1971; Venegas Delgado 1994; Mathews 1955; Cordero Michel 1992). Their sentiment of being a part of more than one territory, to be Cuban, and yet feel Dominican, to be Puerto Rican, and yet consider the Dominican Republic or Haiti home, stands out in their political writings and actions. Martí, a son of Spanish immigrants who embraced a life almost exclusively dedicated to Cuban independence, clearly expresses this consciousness in a letter addressed to his Dominican friend Federico Henríquez y Carvajal: "What need is there for me to speak to you of Santo Domingo? In what does it differ from Cuba? You are not a Cuban, and where is there a better Cuban than you? And is not Gómez a Cuban? And I, what am I, and who shall assign me a soil?" (Martí 1953:163). This expression of Caribbeanness emanated from two increasingly intertwined political battles. One relates to the struggle to free Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish colonialism. The second pertains to the fight against the United States' imperial ambitions in the area. The promoters of Caribbeanness feared that the United States would replace Spain as a colonial power in Cuba and Puerto Rico, as well as undermine the very survival of the independent

nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Mathews 1955:196; Venegas Delgado 1994:119; Estrade 1982:107; Rama 1971:15-17). In an effort to win these critical political battles, they called for the creation of a confederation of the Greater Caribbean islands. Betances, a person of African and European descent who also spent most of his life fighting for the independence of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the creation of this Caribbean confederation (Rama 1971:13-21; Mathews; Suárez Díaz 1968:27-29) summarized their rationale in a speech pronounced in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in 1870:

Thus, my brothers, our past is so interwoven that I cannot paint a historical sketch of Cuba without finding traits already written in the history of Haiti. We are not allowed anymore to separate our respective lives. I repeat it; from one point to another of the large islands of the Caribbean Sea, every mind is agitated by the same question; it is the future of the Antilles. Who will be so blind as not to see it? We carry on the same fight; we struggle for the same cause, therefore we must live the same life. [...] United we will form the chain of forces that will dominate our enemies, the only network capable of saving us [...] It is in vain that Spain will seek to crush the insurrection, to later sell Cuba to the United States and open the way to the absorption of all the Antilles by the Anglo-Saxon race. Let's unite, let's love each other, let's form one people. (Betances quoted in Bonafoux 1970:114-115)

Betances' passionate speech before a Haitian audience illustrates the transcendence of racial and linguistic differences intrinsic to Caribbeanness and the project of a confederation. For Martí, Betances, Hostos and others, unity based on a shared Caribbean consciousness was the only path to freedom for the people of the region. Maceo's rallying cry for a "new republic" unifying Cuba, Santo Domingo and Haiti placed him at the heart of this Caribbean political project. Yet, Estrade, Rama and other historians have mostly ignored Maceo's contribution to this remarkable pan-Caribbean nationalism. A major re-evaluation of Maceo's contribution is therefore necessary.

Maceo's inclusion of Haiti in the Caribbean agenda is critical for this analysis. Indeed, Maceo's official statement in favor of the

Republic of Haiti was politically audacious. At a time when the human resources of the insurrection were dwindling and Maceo was looking for support, this declaration could alienate many white insurgents against the Afro-Cuban leader at the benefit of the Spaniards' counterinsurgency strategy.⁴ Ada Ferrer's (1999:58-59) historical investigations have shown that the fear that Cuba become another "Black Republic"—a common expression for Haiti—consistently fueled strong suspicion and outburst of racism among elements of white insurgents against their Afro-Cuban companions in arms. Ferrer (1999:59), following Maceo's biographers (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989:100-101; Foner 1977:61-63), recalls that Maceo's own career within the liberation army was hampered by fears that he would lead Afro-Cuban insurgents to establish black power in Cuba. In a broader perspective, "the Haitian Revolution," as David Geggus summarizes it, "indirectly contributed to keeping Cuba a colony through the nineteenth century in that memories of the revolution reinforced the fears of slave rebellion and race war which deterred and divided Creole resistance" (Geggus 2001:250).

Maceo's overt reference to Haiti in the adverse political context of generalized anti-Haitian discourse demands more investigation as stated by Geggus:

Non-white politicians from Antonio Rebouças [...] to [...] Antonio Maceo in Cuba had their careers hampered by charges of seeking to emulate or being in league with the state born of black revolution. Future research will need to separate the smear tactics of white opponents from evidence of genuine admiration. [...] We still lack a clear answer to Mimi Sheller's question: Did black Jamaicans [or blacks elsewhere] see Haiti as an example to follow or avoid? (Geggus 2001:249)

Mimi Sheller's question (2000:245) about the Afro-Caribbeans' sentiment vis-à-vis Haiti—evoked here by Geggus—inspires my study of Maceo's pan-Caribbean ideology. I synthetically trace and expose the multifarious appearances of Haiti in Maceo's political career since his rise to prominence in the Cuban nationalist struggle. Elements to address Sheller's question as well as Maceo's ideology can be found in

his declarations about Haiti recorded in his political correspondence. Further elements are found in his two journeys to Haiti in 1879 and 1890. My approach adds a new perspective to Maceo's historiography since the relationship between the Afro-Cuban leader and Haiti has not yet been specifically studied.⁵ This reevaluation of well-known facts significantly deepens our understanding of Caribbeanness.

Maceo, Haiti and the Fear of Black Rule during the Ten Years' War

Maceo's straightforward political declaration in favor of a "new republic," of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti was without a doubt very significant. Torres Cuevas warned, however, that isolating this proclamation would lead to a false interpretation. For the Cuban historian,

The Proclamation to the inhabitants of the Eastern Department must be seen for what it was: the attempt to maintain the hope in victory on the basis of a pledge taking root in his troops and followers—a majority of former slaves. This is another factor that cannot be overlooked in Antonio Maceo's activity during this very tragic moment for the independence of Cuba. He was the symbol and the standard of this unredeemed group of poor blacks and slaves who still endured the shackles and the whip and remained in the same condition after the end of the hostilities. (Torres Cuevas 1995:152)

Torres Cuevas rightly emphasizes Maceo's relationship with the men and women of African descent who fought under his command against Spanish troops. Born in 1845 in Santiago de Cuba, the son of free people of color, Maceo joined the ranks of the insurgent army only a few days following the beginning of the Ten Years' War on October 10, 1868. Endowed with outstanding skills in leadership and combat, Maceo became the leading Afro-Cuban figure of the insurgent movement, long before his Protest of Baraguá. More than any other military figure of his racial and social background, Maceo came to symbolize the Afro-Cuban struggle for freedom and equality. Torres Cuevas rightly underscores the strategic purpose of Maceo's proclamation; it

united Afro-Cubans within the insurgency. Nonetheless, he overlooks the political significance of Maceo's reference to Haiti for both Cuban and Caribbean nationalism in the nineteenth century.

The audacity of the proclamation in a hostile context is indisputable. In her seminal study of the Afro-Cuban struggle for equality, Helg (1995:17) contends that the fear of the Haitian Revolution and that of a conspiracy of Afro-Caribbeans and Afro-Cubans to make Cuba a black republic nurtured many whites' portrayals of Afro-Cubans as a threat to both whites and the Cuban nation. While Maceo's initiative could appeal to his majority of Afro-Cuban followers as Torres Cuevas suggests, it also had all the potential of striking a deadly blow to the uneasy racial collaboration among insurgents. It could even strengthen the position of the Spanish authorities that skillfully manipulated the memory of the Haitian revolution. By evoking the establishment of a "Black Republic" on the smoking ashes of the French colony of Saint-Domingue and the subsequent massacre of white colonists they sought to undermine the Cuban anti-colonialist movement (Ferrer 1999:48).⁶ Examples of such use of the Haitian scarecrow by Spaniards abound. An 1876 Spanish report on the insurrection indicated that the character of the insurrection had changed (AHN, Sección de Ultramar, legajo 4936, doc. 874). The original white leadership of the insurrection had faded out, leaving the preeminence to Cuban blacks and Caribbean foreigners.⁷ The report noted that, "What in the beginning could have been considered as the struggle for independence has now taken on the fierce character of war of the races." The report concluded that Spanish defeat would mean "the end of all civilization [...]" (AHN, Sección de Ultramar, legajo 4936, doc. 874). Considering the highly problematic nature of any reference to Haiti in the Cuban conflict, one can, with Geggus (2001:249), legitimately ask if Maceo's proclamation is not an "example of genuine admiration" for Haiti!

On several instances during the war, Maceo's popularity and successful career fueled the suspicion among white insurgents that Maceo would lead Afro-Cuban insurgents to establishing a new Haiti in Cuba (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:100; Ferrer 1999:59). In 1876, for instance, Maceo was rumored to be favoring black officers over

white officers. This constituted an unmistakable proof that the Afro-Cuban leader was harboring the hidden intention of establishing black supremacy in Cuba (Ferrer 1999:59; Foner 1977:53-55, 61). Maceo responded to these allegations in a letter addressed to Tomás Estrada Palma, president of the auto-proclaimed Cuban Republic. First, Maceo expressed his disappointment that the rumors did not come from the enemy but rather “from our brothers who, forgetting the republican principles, which should guide them, have followed personal political ends.” Further, he made his political agenda clear: “and since [I] belong to the class of color, without considering myself worth less than other men. [...] I energetically protest with all my power that neither now, nor at anytime, am I to be considered an advocate of such a system” (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:64-65). According to Ferrer (1999:60), Maceo’s statement must be interpreted as a strong defense of his position as an “ideal patriot above political self-interest,” within the Cuban Republic in formation. His letter to President Estrada Palma is also a strong rejection of racism and the race wars that overshadowed the building of the Republic of Haiti. To use Geggus’ words, Maceo did not consider the concept of “Black Republic,”—implying the exclusion of white individuals from political power and land ownership—“as an example to follow.”

Maceo’s anti-racist statement raises a fundamental question. Was he contradicting himself when calling in March 1878, only two years later, for “a new Republic assimilated to that of our sisters Santo Domingo and Haiti?” Was he giving a misleading token of good faith in his letter of 1876 because it was addressed to President Estrada Palma—a white Cuban? Was he adapting his discourse to different political contexts and audiences?

Answering this question posed no challenge to the Spaniards, engaged in the task of combating the Cuban insurrection. Spanish officer Camilo Polavieja (1898:97), for instance, was convinced of the Afro-Cubans’ desire to establish black power: “it is true, it is absolutely true that in the war [blacks and whites] fought against us, but, although they are apparently united, in reality, each of the two races is working for itself, with the hope of being one day, the one

that obtains the triumph and keeps the power.” Similarly, foreign diplomats were concerned by the Haitian-like direction of Cuban events under Maceo’s leadership in 1878. The Consul of France in Havana considered that the prospect of total pacification was farther than ever because “there are [...] many difficulties to overcome. They are so great and so complex that the least hostile spirits against the Spanish regime give up hope and don’t see an end to the insurrection. The black specter, which is not a fiction, constitutes by itself the greatest difficulty” (MAE, Correspondance Politique des Consuls, n°92, fol. 258). Coming to a similar conclusion, the consul of the United Kingdom saw nothing but a deadly threat in Maceo. In reference to the Afro-Cuban leader he wrote: “a colored man himself, people of his race flocked to his *étandard*, and frequently threatened that if peace were made without the condition that all slaves who had formed the rebels should be freed, he would proclaim a war of the races” (PRO, Foreign Office 277/18, correspondence embassy and consular archives, n°5, fol. 113).

For Torres Cuevas, however, and without exception for all major historians of Maceo, “those who accused Maceo of desiring to promote a war of races, [...] were concealing the humanist and Cuban character of his struggle” (Torres Cuevas 1995:112-114). He argues that a systematic analysis of Maceo’s numerous political statements and actions regarding the question of race leads without mistake to “categorically assert that Antonio Maceo was an anti-racist at heart.” For the Cuban historian, the fundamental feature of Maceo’s humanism is to be found in his profound belief in the essential unity of humankind and in his intolerance of the many factors that divided it. These determinants included the institution of slavery, racial inequality, and all forms of oppression. For Maceo, the pursuit of humanism entailed and could not be dissociated from his struggle against Spanish colonialism, the very source of oppression and inequality in Cuba. Therefore, one must dismiss the hypothesis that Maceo adapted his discourse based on context and audience.

Driven by humanism, Maceo’s struggle against the corrupt heritage of Spanish colonialism also implied a commitment to the resto-

ration of “the dignity of the black race” (Torres Cuevas 1995:115). It is this dignity that Spain denied Afro-Caribbeans when picturing the experience of the people of Haiti in the most degrading fashion—“the end of all civilization.” It is this dignity again that Spain tore into pieces when using this profoundly biased depiction of Haiti to justify the alleged natural inferiority of Africans and their incapacity for freedom, and to better defend colonial society. Consequently, for Maceo, as for Betances, “the battle against Spanish domination in the Caribbean [underwent] a necessary appraisal of the Haitian experience” (Estrade 1973:71). There is no contradiction between the explicit rejection of a black power, addressed in a letter to President Estrada Palma in 1876, and his pro-Haitian and Dominican proclamation of 1878. The inclusion of Haiti in “a new republic” imagined by Maceo is consistent with his humanistic and ethical principles. Maceo opposed the racist colonial discourse about Haiti with a powerful cry for freedom rooted in the Caribbean experience of resistance and survival. For Maceo, the unity of the people of Cuba and the unity of Cuba with Haiti and the Dominican Republic proceeded from the same ideological reasoning.

This conjunction in Maceo’s thought of anti-racism and pro-Caribbean feelings is particularly remarkable in light of the history of the Afro-Cuban struggle for freedom and equality. Helg states that not all Afro-Cuban intellectuals shared Maceo’s political reasoning:

[...] some leaders strove to prove that a revolution along Haitian lines in Cuba was impossible because Afro-Cubans were different from Haitians. Juan Gualberto Gómez, more than any other Afro-Cuban, spared no pains to disprove parallels between Cuba and Haiti. (Helg 1995:51-52)

Born in 1854, Juan Gualberto Gómez was a journalist, an active militant of the cause of independence and one of the leading advocates of the Afro-Cuban struggle for equality and the end of racial discrimination. If one takes into consideration that Gualberto Gómez denied commonalities between Afro-Cubans and Haitians in the 1890s, one can appreciate the “advanced character” both in time and quality of Maceo’s thought.⁸ When, in his proclamation of May 1878, Maceo

identified Haiti and the Dominican Republic as “our sisters,” he did not suggest a difference but rather a common identity between the three peoples.

Maceo’s First Haitian Journey: September 1879-January 1880

On March 23, 1878, a week after the meeting between Maceo and Spanish general-in-chief Martínez Campos, the Afro-Cuban leader launched the troops under his command against Spanish forces (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989 vol. 1:151). However, Maceo’s call to resistance did not prevent the disintegration of the insurgency a few weeks later (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:153-155; Barcia *et al.* 1996:140-145). On May 9, 1878, while the hostilities were drawing to an end, Maceo left Cuba for Jamaica, the neighboring British colony situated south of eastern Cuba. Maceo carried with him the mission of raising funds in the Cuban immigrant community to continue the struggle. The “black specter,” however, frustrated Maceo’s efforts to rally prominent Cuban families residing there and his mission failed (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:161-163). Finding it impossible to return to Cuba, unless he pledged allegiance to Spanish colonial power, Maceo established residence in the British colony (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989 vol. 1:161-164; AHN, Sección de Ultramar, legajo 4937, doc. n°10, f. 36). Nevertheless, Maceo did not renounce his aspirations to “liberty, equality and fraternity” for all Cubans. Dramatic news from Cuba gave him a new opportunity to mobilize for the cause of freedom and social justice.

By August 24, 1879, a new insurrection against Spanish rule known as the *Guerra Chiquita* or Little War broke out in eastern Cuba (Barcia *et al.* 1996:322-336; Ferrer 1991). The insurgents, many of whom had been Maceo’s subordinates during the Ten Years’ War, hoped that their former leader would return to Cuba to join the movement. Maceo worked feverishly to organize an expedition to Cuba. His task was obstructed by rumors about his alleged intentions to promote a war of the races in Cuba. As a result, Cuban exiles tore each other apart on the racial question and refused to endorse Maceo’s leadership

of the proposed expedition (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:165-173). Furthermore, Maceo's activities in Kingston were kept under strict scrutiny by the British authorities (Zacaïr 2001:110-111). The Foreign office had instructed the colonial administration in Jamaica to comply with the Spaniards' official request that the colony not be made a base of operations for Cuban exiles (PRO, Colonial Office 694/18, n°50; Zacaïr 2001:111). Consequently, the prospects of launching an expedition from the shores of Jamaica were particularly hazardous and uncertain. It is in this very adverse climate that on September 12, 1879, Maceo embarked in the port of Kingston on a ship en route to Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Maceo's trip to Haiti was no less significant than his proclamation of March 1878 in favor of a "new republic" that would include Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Its boldness is also indisputable when one considers that it was the first of its kind made by an Afro-Cuban of such important stature as Maceo. It is true that long before Maceo's journey Cubans had established residence in Haiti (Morales Pérez, Sánchez Andrés 1998:184-186, 417-425; Wolf 1973:323-340). Donna Mary Wolf contends that although their community was significantly smaller than that of neighboring Dominican Republic, they impacted Haiti's domestic politics and diplomacy.⁹ In 1876 for instance, Cubans participated in the overthrow of President Michel Domingue by Boisrond-Canal. They reproached Domingue for being too sympathetic to Spanish interests (Wolf 1973:332).¹⁰ During Boisrond-Canal's presidency, Cuban immigrants enjoyed both tolerance and sympathy from Haitian authorities. On several occasions, the Spaniards complained to the Haitian government about this state of affairs. In 1877, the tension between Spain and Haiti increased as the Spaniards dispatched the warship *Jorge Juan* into the harbor of Port-au-Prince and threatened to bombard the Haitian capital (Morales Pérez and Sánchez Andrés 1998:54; Heintl and Heintl 1978:266).¹¹ They sought to punish Boisrond-Canal's overt pro-Cuban posture and to obtain reparations after a series of anti-Spanish demonstrations in Port-au-Prince led to the attack of the Spanish consulate. In light of these events, one might wonder if the favorable conditions enjoyed by

the Cubans under President Boisrond-Canal contributed to influencing Maceo's resolution to embark for Port-au-Prince.

Maceo was clearly aware of the situation of Cuban immigrants. While in Jamaica, he had received several letters from Nicolás Pérez, a Cuban residing in Port-au-Prince. In his first letter dated December 10, 1878, Pérez indicated that although the Cubans lacked leadership and organization, he believed that "all desired to contribute" to the cause of Cuba. He added that one Cuban, Paul Naudeau, enjoyed good reputation in Haitian society and was ready to use this advantage if instructed to do so (Maceo 1948, vol. 1:183-184). In another letter dated May 28, 1879, Pérez informed Maceo of the progress made by the Cubans of Haiti to "organize a Junta to collect funds" for the cause of freedom. Further in the letter, Pérez described the spirit animating the Cuban community: "Cubans residing in Haiti live in the most perfect union [...] [they] do not recognize distinctions between races and they share only one inalterable thought, to see a free Cuba" (Maceo 1948, vol 1:195). Pérez's words were in conformity with Maceo's ideological principles and it is not disputable that the Afro-Cuban leader must have appreciated them in light of the difficulties experienced in Jamaica (Franco Ferrán 1974:47).¹² Furthermore, beyond the critical question of race, Pérez's accounts offered Maceo tangible hope for collecting the indispensable human and financial resources to return to Cuba.

When Maceo arrived in Port-au-Prince on September 15, 1879, Haiti was in the midst of political uncertainties (Von Grafenstein 1987:82). In July, President Boisrond-Canal had abandoned his functions after his fellow member of the Liberal Party and rival Jean-Pierre Boyer-Bazelais challenged him in a violent armed conflict for power.¹³ A Provisional Government, headed by General Joseph Lamothe, was formed before the election by the Haitian congress of a new president, to ensure a smooth political transition. During the first days of his stay in the Haitian capital, Maceo had several meetings with Lamothe (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:133). The content of their conversation is well known thanks to a letter written by Maceo to Lamothe on September 23, 1879. In this letter, Maceo denounced Spanish colonialism as the source of the great evils of Cuba—the absence of political liberty,

racial inequality and the institution of slavery. He praised Lamothe for his “love of freedom,” and asked him to continue to actively support the cause of Cuba (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:134). He assured Lamothe and the Haitian people of his profound gratitude once the independence of Cuba was achieved. Concluding his passionate letter he argued: “General, I do not need to explain to you the advantages that would result from an alliance between the two countries since they are inhabited by people of the same race and should therefore support and defend the same interests” (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:135).

Strikingly, the final argument presented by Maceo to Lamothe closely resembles the words he had used in the proclamation to the inhabitants of the Eastern Department of Cuba in March 1878. In fact, his use of such vague terms as “alliance”—*alianza*—and “assimilated republic”—*república asimilada*—makes it difficult to define the exact contours of the political project he pursued. In Maceo’s defense, the promoters of the Caribbean confederation never shared a strict definition of their vision (Estrade 1982:116; Mathews 1955:218). Remarkably, however, Maceo’s words echoed those pronounced by Betances to a Haitian audience in 1870, nine years earlier (Mathews 1955:199; Suárez Díaz 1969:32). Maceo’s proposition to Lamothe shows that he clearly shared with Betances the notion that the union between the greater islands of the Caribbean was not only geared toward the independence of the remaining Spanish colonies. The union constituted the guarantee of the independence of all. Maceo also shared with Betances the notion that Cubans, Haitians and others formed one people. In fact, the ideas of similarity and inseparability formed the basis of his letter to Lamothe. It is no coincidence that Maceo thought it “useless, to narrate the history of Cuba [...] since Cuban history is similar to Haitian history or the history of any other colony” (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:133). For Maceo, Cuba was an “enslaved people fighting to win its independence next to another people of the same origin, that already enjoys an autonomous life, and too generous not to offer to its brother a protective hand” (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:134).

Antonio Maceo, Lysius Salomon and Spanish Diplomacy

On October 23, 1879, the election by congress of National Party leader Lysius Félicité Salomon as president of Haiti concluded the transitional process that had started since Boisrond-Canal's departure in July (Heinl and Heinl 1978:272). For the Cuban community and for Maceo, the political shift turned out to be prejudicial (Maceo 1950:144-159; Rodríguez Demorizi 1978:47). Indeed, less than three months later, Maceo hastily left Port-au-Prince while hiding from the Haitian police, and the Cuban immigrants were compelled to choose between pledging allegiance to Spain or facing expulsion (Maceo 1950: 155; Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:196; Wolf 1973:344). Historians (Aparicio 1967:238-239; Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol 1:191) have explained this dramatic reversal of Haiti's friendly policy towards the Cuban movement for independence by pointing out the effects of the acute struggle for power between the Liberal and National Party, as well as Salomon's personal sympathy for Spain.¹⁴ In the absence of Salomon's version, their conclusions have almost exclusively been based upon Maceo's personal account of the events. The Afro-Cuban leader recorded his story in a very detailed letter sent on February 6, 1880, three weeks after leaving Port-au-Prince, to Máximo Gómez, a Dominican friend and Ten Years' War veteran (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:154-159). In this letter, Maceo bitterly complained that Salomon made him an agent of the Liberal Party, the party of ex-president Boisrond-Canal but also of General Lamothe, now in opposition to National Party rule:

My mission is more noble and worth consideration, because fighting in a political party for more personal gain is not equal to working for the good of a collectivity. [...] So then, why, while making abuse of his nauseating politics, does he pretext that I had mixed myself in his country's affairs? [...] Why does he assume that I would serve a political party of his country? (Maceo 1950, vol. 1: 157-158)

Maceo's energetic defense of the nobility of his cause has led many historians, all sympathetic to the Afro-Cuban's point of view, to disprove Salomon's political short-sightedness. In fact, Maceo's personal

records do not provide any evidence of meetings with Haitians who did not adhere to the Liberal Party (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:133-135). His apparent exclusive connections with Liberals, may have put him at odds with Nationals during this period of uncertainty and tense political competition, that led up to Salomon's election to the presidency of Haiti. In addition, it is difficult to believe that Salomon would have forgotten the close connection that had existed between the Liberals and the Cuban community under Boisrond-Canal's presidency.

As for Salomon's sympathy to Spanish interests, a closer look at Spanish diplomatic papers invites much caution. On October 9, 1879, two weeks before Salomon's election by Haitian congress, Spanish consul Antonio Fierro evaluated the new political situation with much concern for the capacity of Spain to prevent the collaboration between the new Haitian leader and Cuban revolutionaries. When referring to Maceo's relationship with Salomon, Fierro reported:

As far as I am assured, [Maceo] thinks about leaving for Puerto Plata. I do not believe it, since I am told that he is waiting for the help of one of the pretenders to the presidency of this Republic, called Salomon, who is presently holding the office of Minister of Foreign affairs. He is on the best terms with him and they have made mutual promises to each other. Therefore, I am almost certain that he will delay his trip, or he won't complete it, if this man becomes president, as is very probable. In this case, he will be able to obtain from this republic the help he wishes and he might transform her into a center for his machinations. (AMAE, Fondo Correspondencia consulados, legajo H 2023, dispatch n°43)

Fierro's suggestion that Maceo and Salomon had established good personal contacts prior to the Afro-Cuban's trip to Haiti is particularly intriguing, since none of the parties involved mentioned ever having done so. In fact, Fierro's statement may be true. Salomon had been exiled in Jamaica after Boisrond-Canal's rise to power in 1876, and he had only returned to his country on August 19, 1879 (Heinl and Heinl 1978:272). Therefore, both Salomon and Maceo were residing in the British colony at the same period of time and, as the consul suggested, they may very well have met

each other and exchanged promises. As we shall see later in more detail, Cuban and Haitian exiles used to intermingle in the Jamaican capital.

Fierro was not the only one to have wrongly predicted a close collaboration between Salomon and Maceo. Maceo himself recognized that he had been confident about the outcome of his journey to Haiti. He wrote in his letter to Gómez that:

When I left Jamaica with the aim of seeing you and Calixto García again in the location we had agreed, I stopped in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. I aimed at looking for the cooperation of the Haitian people and of President Salomon, in favor of the people of their race suffering in Cuba from the horrors of the servitude of the colonial system. I believed to be the best person to obtain this from them, since I belong to the same race. (Maceo 1948, vol. 1:78)¹⁵

Maceo's faith in Salomon's cooperation on the grounds of racial solidarity was probably based on his misjudgment of the complex role race played in Haitian domestic politics. The "question of color," the alleged distinctions between blacks and mulattoes, figured prominently in the debates that agitated the Haitian political scene (Von Grafenstein 1987: 86; Nicholls 1978:377). The new Haitian president, a member of the black oligarchy, was the heir of a political family that denounced "mulatto preponderance" in the exercise of political power and called upon black mobilization to put an end to this alleged hegemony (Nicholls 1978:378-379; Von Grafenstein 1987:85). Maceo's account suggests that race may have played a role in the difficulties he faced in Port-au-Prince. In his letter to Gómez, Maceo declared that "as little as I could study president Salomon's policy, I believe that he hates people more for the color of their skin than for their minor or greater political deviation" (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:145). It is likely that Maceo's comments on Salomon's perceived racism were above all a reflection of the Afro-Cuban's exclusive contacts with Liberals. It is not clear at all if Salomon's anti-mulatto stance played a determining role in the course of the events. After all, Maceo himself did not seem to be convinced by this hypothesis. He seems genuinely puzzled

when he wondered just after his comments on Salomon's supposed racist feelings: "is he dominated by any passions?" (Maceo 1950, vol. 1:145). A response to Maceo's interrogation might more convincingly be found in Haiti's diplomatic situation during this period.

As Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1990:50) states, the independence of Haiti was durably affected by the long-lasting political and diplomatic isolation imposed on her by France and the United States among others. Driven by their racist scorn and horror for the Black Republic, the great powers did not hesitate to display or to use military force against the Caribbean nation to ensure that their interests would prevail. In the meantime, they pursued unequal commercial relations with Haiti that contributed to anchor her into economic dependency and underdevelopment. The weakening of Haitian independence came also from the Haitian leaders' own doubts about the capacity of their country to survive, ironically enough, without the political protection of one of the great powers that so reluctantly recognized her existence (Nicholls 1979:139). As David Nicholls argues, "Salomon perhaps went much further than any other president in this period towards ceding Haitian territory and inviting foreign intervention in the affairs of the black republic" (Nicholls 1979:139). Therefore, without downplaying Salomon's links to Spain or the effects of the political rivalry between Liberals and Nationals, it is clear that Salomon's opposition to Maceo also came from the reasoning that collaboration with Spain was the necessary price for the survival of Haiti. Salomon's position was diametrically opposed to that of the promoters of the ideal of Caribbeanness who believed that unity between the Caribbean peoples was the only path to freedom and independence. Salomon was bound to oppose Maceo and the events proved just that.

On November 9, 1879, Fierro reported to Madrid that the new Haitian government "has told me its disposition to give me support" (AMAE, Fondo Correspondencia Consulados, legajo H 2023, dispatch n°50). Maceo was hearing rumors of his imminent assassination and some Haitians and Cubans informed him of the collaboration between President Salomon and the Spanish consul (Maceo 1948, vol. 1:80). On December 23, 1879, in a private meeting, Salomon received Fierro

and the commander of a Spanish vessel that was anchored in the harbor of Port-au-Prince. The Spanish officer recorded that:

[...] M. President of the Republic received us warmly and displayed his sympathy for Spain and his desire that our good bilateral relationship not suffer any alteration. He condemned the events of Cuba. With our agreement, M. Consul declared that Salomon could prove his feelings by preventing any conjuration in the territory of the Republic, any armament of an expedition against Cuba, and proceed to the delivery of Antonio Maceo. (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 8, doc. 1.3, fol. 87)

The same day, Maceo narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in the suburbs of Port-au-Prince. The rumor of Maceo's death rapidly spread among the Cuban community and the people of Port-au-Prince. From the night of the 23rd until the early morning of the 24th, an angry mob of Cubans and Haitians assaulted the Spanish consulate, pelting several Spanish officers with stones. The Spanish diplomat was quick to push further his advantage. Fierro demanded that the Haitian government immediately take action against Maceo, the Cuban community and their Haitian supporters. He also denounced the attitude of some police officers who did not oppose the assault, thereby questioning the Haitian government's declaration of sympathy toward Spain.

Under such pressure, the Haitian government responded positively to almost all Spanish demands. The Haitian government agreed in a letter to expel Maceo from the island, take action against the Cuban immigrants, and punish Maceo's Haitian supporters. In a dispatch of January 17, 1880, the Spanish consulate in Port-au-Prince reported that Maceo had escaped the persecution of the Haitian police on board of the French Steamer *Desirade* (AGM, Sección de Ultramar, legajo R 563, n°6). However, Fierro satisfactorily informed the governor of Cuba that through the measures taken, the Haitian government had been able to "disorganize the Cuban junta, break down the conspirators' faith, disperse its principal elements and considerably weaken their capacity for action" (AGM, Sección de Ultramar, legajo R 563, n°6).

Enduring Contacts with Haitians: January 1880-December 1890

Between January 1880 and December 1890, Maceo led an extraordinarily rich and eventful life in numerous places of the Caribbean basin such as the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Jamaica, Mexico, New Orleans and the Turks Islands among others. Strikingly, the scholars of Maceo have not recorded any contacts, during this ten-year-period, between the Afro-Cuban leader and Haiti or Haitians. The only exception was a brief call in the harbor of Cap Haïtien, on July 3, 1880, on board of the U.S. vessel *Santo Domingo* officially en route to New York from the Dominican Republic (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:209; Foner 1977:104).

There is some evidence, however, showing that there may have been more links between Maceo and Haiti than traditional accounts have suggested. Spanish diplomatic sources, for instance, signaled Maceo's arrival in Saint Thomas in the Danish Virgin Islands on January 27, 1880. A Spanish informant reported that "on the next day of his arrival, [Maceo and other companions] looked for the residence of the ex-president of Haiti, Boirond-Canal, because they needed to see him. Maceo's principal objective was to collect money that [the Cubans] lack completely" (AGM, Sección de Ultramar, legajo R 563, planes del enemigo). Although it is true that Boisrond-Canal had established residence in Saint-Thomas since July 1879, the Spanish dispatch does not specify whether or not Maceo truly met the former president of Haiti in person. To my knowledge, there is no evidence in any other source that the two men actually met. However, it is also unlikely that the information on the Afro-Cuban leader's intention of visiting Boisrond-Canal was fabricated for the sole purpose of discrediting the figure of Maceo.

The Spanish consul reported in June 1880 that Maceo was maintaining links with exiled members of the Liberal Party. The consul warned of a conspiracy to violently overthrow president Salomon, jointly organized by "Boyer Bazelais from Jamaica, the ex-president Boisrond-Canal from Saint-Thomas and the guerrilla chief Antonio Maceo from Puerto Plata" (AMAE, Fondo Correspondencia Consula-

dos, legajo H 2023, n°23). Once again, the Spanish report does not allege facts regarding association of the three individuals in conspiracy against Salomon. However, the consul's allegations about Maceo's continuing connections with Haitians were not necessarily purely fictional. A new report, dated March 25, 1881, written by the Spanish consul in Jamaica was much more specific in that regard. The consul informed Havana and Madrid that Maceo had again taken residence in Kingston and added:

[Maceo is] conspiring now with several Haitian immigrants residing here with the purpose of overthrowing Salomon. According to faithful reports that are communicated to me, it is indubitable that today Maceo's objective, when bringing his help to these Haitians, is tied to the hope that once in power they will provide him with their entire cooperation for the happy success of his criminal cause. And in his illusion, he sends secret instructions to his agents residing in [Cuba] particularly in the Eastern Department. He encourages them not to lose heart and to sustain latent among those of his race the idea that he in person will soon be heading a formidable movement that will result in no less than triumph. [...] [Maceo] fearing that his correspondence could be intercepted takes the greatest precautions in that respect and sends it via Haiti. (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 8, doc. 4.4, f. 653)¹⁶

In any case, the elements exposed by the consul of Spain in Kingston are intriguing especially since he sent another dispatch to Havana dated April 14, 1881, containing similar information. He wrote:

Antonio Maceo is still residing here. He is intimately linked to the Haitian party whose chief is Boyer-Bazelais, a pretender to power in this republic. Boyer-Bazelais has offered Maceo, as I stated before, his most resolute support once he is in power. [...] In conclusion, I still have to tell Your Excellency that the few supporters of Maceo who live [in Jamaica] met in the evening of the 9th in one of the Clubs where Haitians gather now. After some drinks, they went into the streets in groups shouting insolently that they would soon go to Cuba and would not spare the head of a single white man. [...] Maceo, according to what I was told, disapproved such unnecessary ostentation; not out of

virtue, but because in reality, he says that this only contributes to compromise his cause. (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 8, doc. 4.4, f. 655)

In this case again, the information presented by the consul is not confirmed by any other sources. Nonetheless, since Maceo and Boyer-Bazelais lived in Kingston at the same time, they may very well have met each other and shared their mutual interests. Unfortunately, neither of the protagonists has left any written traces of their supposed meetings. However, one detail confers much credibility to the consul's dispatch. This element is Maceo's reported disapproval of anti-white statements shouted in the streets of Kingston by some of the individuals who attended the meeting the consul referred to. Maceo's alleged reaction speaks very positively in his favor and demolishes Spanish accusation of anti-white racism against him. This information is fully consistent with Maceo's political ideology and practice. The consul had clearly no interest in fabricating facts that would aid rather than harm the Afro-Cuban leader. It is certainly not by mistake that he felt compelled to downplay Maceo's statement by denying his sincerity. In sum, even though not every fact provided by the consul is verifiable, it is likely that he was given reliable information on Maceo's enduring connections with Haitian exiles in the British colony.

The consul's suggestion that Cubans and Haitians established contacts and conceived political plans linking Haitian domestic affairs to those of Cuba were confirmed in March 1883, when Boyer-Bazelais attempted to invade Haiti from Jamaica (Nicholls 1979:110; Heint and Heint 1978:280-281). The invasion included not only exiled Haitians in the Bahamas and Jamaica but also a few Cubans (Heint and Heint 1978:281). As for Maceo, he had left Jamaica for Honduras via Costa Rica since the month of June 1881, and did not take part in Boyer-Bazelais' military adventure, which turned out to be a terrible failure. It is not before 1888, that Salomon was driven out of power by a military uprising that permitted the return of the Liberal Party to the reins of Haiti (Nicholls 1978:379; Nicholls 1979:110; Von Grafenstein 1987:87).

On October 9, 1889, General Florvil Hyppolite became president

of Haiti, a position he held until his death in 1896. Hyppolite entrusted a leading figure of the Liberal Party Anténor Firmin with conducting Haitian foreign policy. Firmin was a journalist, lawyer and intellectual who had established multiple relations with other Caribbean and South American intellectuals while living in Paris at the end of the 1870s (Morales Pérez; Sánchez Andrés 1998:201-202; Plummer 1998:211-212). One of them was Betances with whom Firmin came to share a strong belief in the ideal of Caribbeanness, to ensure the independence of the peoples of the region (Dash 2004:51). Firmin's presence in Hyppolite's government signaled the end of Salomon's foreign policy, disregarding inter-Caribbean intellectual and political ties.

Interestingly, it is only two months after Hyppolite's inauguration as the new leader of Haiti that, on December 21, 1889, Maceo returned to Port-au-Prince. As in 1879, Maceo sailed to Haiti from the Jamaican capital, where he had arrived from the United States (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol. 1:332). However, the conditions of Maceo's second trip to Haiti were radically different from those existing ten years earlier. By this time, Maceo had solicited and obtained the authorization from Captain General of Cuba Manuel Salamanca to officially return to his native island (Franco Ferrán [1951] 1989, vol.1:332). The historiography of Maceo unanimously explains that he sailed for Port-au-Prince in view of travelling on to Havana later, because he had been unable to find a direct means of transportation from Jamaica to Cuba (Foner 1977:135). In fact, a closer look at Spanish diplomatic sources challenges this traditional explanation of Maceo's trajectory via Haiti.

On December 18, 1889, the Spanish consul in Kingston informed his colleague in Port-au-Prince that:

The Cuban *cabecilla* Antonio Maceo will probably be boarding the Royal Mail Steamer *Dervent* that is about to leave tomorrow for this place. He told me that he plans to spend several days in Port-au-Prince, with the aim of dealing with some projected business. Formerly authorized by His Excellency the Governor General of the island of Cuba to grant him a passport for Santiago de Cuba or Havana, I sent him one for Haiti and for his final destination. (AMAE, Fondo Correspondencia Consulados, H 1928, n°52)

Maceo was indeed on board of the Steamer *Derwent* that linked Kingston to Port-au Prince. On December 28, 1889, the Spanish consul in Port-au-Prince informed Havana that Maceo's plans in Haiti—as told by Maceo himself—consisted in establishing a lottery and a farm colony (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 20, doc. 3). The consul added that Maceo would stay in Haiti about a month or more before leaving for Cuba to sell some property that he still possessed in the eastern part of his native island. In conclusion, the consul reported Maceo's "intention to live again outside of Cuba" (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 20, doc. 3).

Maceo now appeared not to be in any hurry to return to his homeland and seemed to have even less intention of challenging Spanish rule. To his great surprise, the Spanish consul in Port-au-Prince noticed that Maceo "comes to the consulate every day and doesn't take steps without informing me and consulting me" (AGI, Archivo del Teniente D. Camilo Polavieja, legajo 20, doc. 3). Furthermore, Maceo's new trip to Haiti did not seem to be the simple detour that traditional accounts have suggested. It is hard to conceive that Maceo planned to stay a month or more in Haiti while submitting the lottery and farm colony projects to the Haitian government only because he was unable to reach Cuba directly from Jamaica! Newly rediscovered papers, conserved by his relative Gonzalo Cabrales (1996:266-267), indicate that he did in fact submit two project proposals to Hyppolite's government.¹⁷

Maceo's sudden change of attitude towards Spanish agents and authorities was beyond any doubt a disguise for his concealed agenda. For Cabrales, the two contracts solicited by Maceo did not reflect Maceo's true intentions. They only served to justify his stay in Haiti. Maceo's second trip to the Black Republic was not fortuitous. It undeniably served his interests, which included resuming talks and gaining the support of some of the new representatives of Haitian political power. Maceo's second trip indicates that it was certainly as meaningful for the building of the ideal of Caribbeanness as his protest of Baraguá and his journey to Haiti in 1879.

Conclusion

Maceo's struggle against Spanish colonialism, to secure a free and democratic Cuba, was closely associated to the ideal of Caribbeanness. Maceo expressed this connection for the first time and with much conviction when he enacted his momentous Protest of Baraguá, and stood as the foremost leader of Cuban resistance against Spain. The formulation and pursuit of Caribbeanness proceeded from the definition of his relationship with the neighboring Republic of Haiti. The memory of Haiti and her unique revolution played a critical role in Maceo's political battle. The defenders of Spanish colonialism manipulated the theme of the destructive and barbarous Black revolution to prove the non-viability of the independence project in Cuba. The representation of Haiti as the antithesis of civilization—based on European standards—greatly contributed to weakening the independence movement as it fueled the fear many Cuban whites had of Afro-Cuban leadership in the war against the Spaniards. Maceo's popularity and leading position in the Cuban liberation army placed him at the center of the Haitian question.

Maceo's relationship with Haiti proved to be unique in complexity and significance within the Cuban nationalist movement. The Afro-Cuban leader refused the artificial and biased choice presented to the Cuban people between Spanish civilization and African barbarism. Rather than trying to differentiate himself and the Afro-Cubans from the Haitian people, he claimed Haitian history and heritage of liberty and resistance as his own. His ideal of Caribbeanness was forcefully expressed in his call for a political entity including Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He brought forward the racial kinship between the two islands while clearly opposing the concept of a Black republic as undemocratic. When Maceo temporarily left Cuba in 1878, his ideal of Caribbeanness was further developed and oriented by his multiple contacts—which were probably more extensive and complex than previously thought—with key actors of Haitian politics. Maceo's unsuccessful collaboration with Salomon demonstrated the strength and boldness of his ideal. While Salomon thought that the preservation of the existence of Haiti required her to compromise with colonial-

ist powers and eventually relinquish her independence of action in internal affairs, Maceo envisioned the union of Cuba and Haiti as the source and guarantee of freedom, social justice and independence. In that regard, Maceo's contribution to the ideal of Caribbeanness rivals the writings and actions of its most famous advocates, José Martí, Ramón Emeterio Betances and Eugenio María de Hostos.

References

Manuscripts

AGI (Archivo General de Indias, Seville). 1880. Archivo del Teniente General D. Camilo Polavieja. Legajo 8, conspiración de la raza de color.

_____. 1890-1892. Archivo del Teniente General D. Camilo Polavieja. Legajo 20, trabajos de conspiración del titulado general insurrecto Antonio Maceo.

AHN (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid). 1875-1876. Sección de Ultramar, legajo 4936. Expediente de la guerra de Cuba, 11a y 12a parte, mando de los generales Carbó y Jovellar, libro 15.

_____. 1878. Sección de ultramar, legajo 4937, 2a parte. Expediente de la guerra de Cuba, 13a parte, apéndices. Apéndice que contiene las copias de los documentos relativos a la capitulación del Zanjón, cuyos originales existen en el Ministerio de la Guerra.

AGM (Archivo General Militar, Segovia). 1880. Sección de Ultramar, legajo R 563.

AMAE (Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid). 1850-1907. Fondo Correspondencia Consulados, H 1928, Kingston, Jamaica.

_____. 1880-1930. Fondo Correspondencia Consulados, H 2023, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MAE (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris). 1878-1880. Correspondance politique des consuls, n° 92, La Havane - Santiago.

_____. 1895. Correspondance politique des consuls, n° 102, La Havane - Santiago.

PRO (Public Record Office, London). 1878. Foreign Office, 277/18. British Consulate Havana.

- _____. 1884-1886. Foreign Office, 426/67. Confidential correspondence respecting filibustering expeditions against Cuba.
- _____. 1878. Colonial Office, 694/18. "Register of secret correspondence. West Indian Department."

Printed Sources

- Aparicio, Raúl. 1967. *Hombradía de Antonio Maceo*. La Habana: Ediciones Unión.
- Barcia, María del Carmen, et al. 1996. *Historia de Cuba: Las luchas por la independencia nacional y las transformaciones estructurales, 1868-1878*. La Habana: Editora Política.
- Bonafoux, Luis. 1970. *Betances*. San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña.
- Buznego Rodríguez, Enrique, Gustavo Pedroso Xiqués and Rolando Zulueta Zulueta. 1986. *Mayor General Máximo Gómez Báez: Sus campañas militares*. 2 vols. La Habana: Editora Política.
- Cabrales Nicolarde, Gonzalo. 1996. *Epistolario de héroes. Cartas y documentos históricos*. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Camps y Feliú, Francisco de. 1890. *Espanoles é insurrectos: recuerdos de la guerra de Cuba*. La Habana: Tip. de A. Álvarez.
- Collazo, Enrique. 1893. *Desde Yara Hasta el Zanjón*, 2nd ed. La Habana: Tipografía de La Lucha.
- Cordero Michel, Emilio. 1992. "Gregorio Luperón y Haití." *Anuario de estudios americanos* 49: 497-528.
- Estrade, Paul. 1973. "Cómo Betances defendió al negro haitiano: Carta a Jules Auguste (1882)." *Sin Nombre* 4 (2): 70-77.
- _____. 1982. "Remarques sur le caractère tardif et avancé de la prise de conscience nationale dans les Antilles espagnoles." *Caravelle* 38: 89-117.
- _____. 1998. "La última guerra de independencia, desde la perspectiva antillana." *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 55 (1): 23-37.
- Dash, Michael. 2004. "Nineteenth-Century Haiti and the Archipelago of the Americas: Anténor Firmin's Letter from St. Thomas." *Research in African Literatures* 2: 44-53.
- Ferrer, Ada. 1991. "Social Aspects of Cuban Nationalism: Race, Slavery, and the Guerra Chiquita, 1879-1880." *Cuban Studies* 21: 37-56.

- _____. 1995. "Esclavitud, ciudadanía y los límites de la nacionalidad cubana: la guerra de los diez años, 1868-1878." *Historia Social* 22: 101-125.
- _____. 1999. *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1878*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Figueredo Díaz, Félix. 1973. *La guerra de Cuba en 1878 – la protesta de Baraguá*. La Habana: Editorial Organismos.
- Figueredo Socarrás, Fernando. 1968. *La Revolución de Yara, 1868-1878: Conferencias*. La Habana: Ediciones Huracán.
- Fick, Carolyn. 1990. *The Making of Haiti: The Haitian Revolution from Below*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Foner, Philip. 1977. *Antonio Maceo: The "Bronze Titan" of Cuba's Struggle for Independence*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Franco Ferrán, José Luciano. [1951] 1989. *Antonio Maceo: Apuntes para una historia de su vida*. 3 vols., reprint and revised. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- _____. 1974. "La Ruta de Antonio Maceo en el Caribe y la América Continental." *Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional José Martí* 16 (2): 43-74.
- _____. 1978. *La protesta de Baraguá: Antecedentes y proyecciones revolucionarias*. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Geggus, David Patrick, ed. 2001. *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Guerra y Sánchez, Ramiro. 1972. *Guerra de los diez años*. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Heinl, Robert Debs and Nancy Gordon Heinl. 1978. *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Helg, Aline. 1995. *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-1912*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- _____. 2001. "La Majorana Revisited: The Unresolved Debate Between Antonio Maceo and José Martí," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 10 (1): 61-89.
- Maceo Grajales, Antonio. 1948. *Papeles de Maceo*. 2 vols. La Habana: Imp. "El Siglo XX."
- _____. 1950. *Ideología política: Cartas y otros documentos*. 2 vols. La Habana: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos e Internacionales.

- Martí y Pérez, José. 1953. *The America of José Martí: Selected Writings of José Martí*. New York: The Noonday Press.
- Mathews, Thomas. 1955. "The Project For a Confederation of the Greater Antilles." *Historia* 5 (2): 183-231.
- Morales Pérez, Salvador and Agustín Sánchez Andrés. 1998. *Diplomacias en conflicto: Cuba y España en el horizonte latinoamericano del 98*. México: Centro de Investigación Científica.
- Nicholls, David. 1978. "The Wisdom of Salomon: Myth or Reality?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 20 (4): 377-392.
- . 1979. *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ochando, T. 1878. *El General Martínez Campos en Cuba: Reseña político-militar de la última campaña de Cuba*. Madrid: Impr. De Fortanet.
- Pirala, Antonio. 1895-1898. *Anales de la guerra de Cuba*. Madrid: F. González Rojas.
- Plummer, Brenda. 1998. "Firmin and Martí at the Intersection of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Africanism." Pp. 210-227 in *José Martí's "Our America."* *From National to Hemispheric Cultural Studies*, edited by Jeffrey Belnap and Raúl Fernández. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Polavieja, Camilo. 1898. *Relación documentada de mi política en Cuba. Lo que vi, lo que hice, lo que anuncié*. Madrid: Impr. de E. Minuesa y Cía.
- Rama, Carlos. 1971. *La idea de la federación antillana en los independentistas puertorriqueños del siglo XIX*. Río Piedras: Ediciones Librería Internacional.
- Rodríguez Demorizi, Emilio. 1978. *Maceo en Santo Domingo*. 2nd ed. Barcelona: Gráficas M. Pareja.
- Sheller, Mimi. 2000. *Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Suárez Díaz, Ada. 1969. "Betances en Nueva York y Haití." *Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña* 12 (43):27-34.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1990. *Haiti: State Against Nation. The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Torres Cuevas, Eduardo. 1995. *Antonio Maceo: Las ideas que sostienen*

- el arma*. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Venegas Delgado, Hernán. 1994. "La confederación antillana: Realidad y esperanza." *Caribbean Studies* 27 (1-2): 118-127.
- Von Grafenstein Gareis, Johanna. 1987. "Haití en los años 1859-1915: carácter y determinaciones de su proceso político." *Secuencia* 9: 81-94.
- Wolf, Donna Marie. 1973. "The Caribbean People of Color and the Cuban Independence Movement." Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh.
- Zacaïr, Philippe. 1999. "Antonio Maceo: Biographie guerrière et politique." Ph.D. diss., Université de Paris Sorbonne Nouvelle.
- _____. 2001. "Roots of Caribbean Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century: The Afro-Cuban Antonio in the British Caribbean." *Cahiers Charles V – Écritures et Représentations des Diasporas* 31: 105-127.

Notes

- ¹ The conditions of the cessation of the hostilities are well documented and discussed in Collazo (1893), Figueredo Socarrás (1968), Ochando (1878), Piralá (1895-1898) and Guerra y Sánchez (1972). They include, for instance, the skillful strategy led by Spanish general-in-chief Arsenio Martínez Campos, the general fatigue and loss of faith in victory amidst the insurgent ranks, and the many divisions debilitating the Cuban anti-colonialist movement. The Pact of Zanjón, the document that put an official end to the hostilities was signed on February 10, 1878.
- ² For the most detailed account, although dated, of Maceo's life, see Franco Ferrán ([1951] 1989). Other works of interest, although drawing largely from Franco, are Foner (1977), Aparicio (1967), Zacaïr (1999). For an insightful study of Maceo's political ideology, see Torres Cuevas (1995).
- ³ All the sources cited above describe in great length the famous meeting. See also Figueredo Díaz (1973), Franco Ferrán (1978).
- ⁴ For a detailed account of the racial implications of the Cuban nationalist movement in the second half of the 19th century, see Ferrer (1999), Ferrer (1995), Helg (1995).

- ⁵ Dominican historian Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi's (1978) approach most closely resembles mine. Rodríguez Demorizi discusses Haiti in a book otherwise centered on the relationship between Maceo and the Dominican Republic.
- ⁶ On the Haitian revolution and the beginnings of Haiti, see Fick (1990), Heintz and Heintz (1978).
- ⁷ Many Dominicans fought in the ranks of the Cuban liberation army. Máximo Gómez was undoubtedly the most famous. On Máximo Gómez's contribution to the Cuban insurrection, see Buznego Rodríguez, Pedrosa Xiqués and Zulueta Zulueta (1986).
- ⁸ I borrowed Paul Estrade's (1982) expression "caractère avancé".
- ⁹ We still lack a complete picture of the Cuban community of Haiti.
- ¹⁰ According to Wolf, "President Domingue was evidently closely allied with the Spanish, as he complied readily to their demands." However, Wolf does not explain Domingue's motives.
- ¹¹ Heintz and Heintz write that not one but two Spanish warships were sent to Port-au-Prince.
- ¹² Franco contends that the racial opposition to Maceo in Jamaica filled the Afro-Cuban leader with despair. This feeling was directly responsible for his decision to travel to Haiti.
- ¹³ The Haitian political scene was dominated alternatively since 1843-1844 by two rival political factions—the Liberal Party and the National Party. Boisrond-Canal was elected president of Haiti in 1876 even though Jean Pierre Boyer-Bazelais was given for favorite. See Von Grafenstein Gareis (1987:82). On the conflict opposing Boisrond-Canal to Boyer-Bazelais, see Heintz and Heintz (1978:269).
- ¹⁴ For more information on Salomon's political trajectory, see Nicholls (1978); Nicholls (1979).
- ¹⁵ A slightly different version appears in Maceo (1950, vol. 1:144).
- ¹⁶ I have found it impossible, at this point of my research, to confirm or to refute the accuracy of this document.
- ¹⁷ Contrary to what Maceo has told Spanish officials, he submitted one proposal to create a lottery and a second one to repair the streets of Port-au-Prince rather than establishing a farm colony. We don't have any details, however, on these proposals.